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Forthcoming in: Social Philosophy and Policy 
 
Robust Political Economy and the Priority of Markets 
Mark Pennington, Department of Political Economy, King’s College, University of London 
mark.pennington@kcl.ac.uk 
Introduction 
Classical liberals argue that markets and freedom of contract should be prioritised in the basic 
structure of society. Critics maintain however that the case for these arrangements depends on the 
existence of highly idealised conditions. Though not rejecting market institutions they suggest that 
given the frictions and power imbalances that characterise ‘real-world’ situations, alternative 
mechanisms should have institutional priority.  
In this paper I defend the priority of markets. I will suggest that the most powerful arguments for 
relying on them do not depend on idealised conditions and that ‘ideal theory’ as currently  practiced, 
should have little role in the evaluation of political economic regimes.  I will set out instead a ‘robust 
political economy’ standard that examines how alternative regime types cope with ‘non-ideal’ 
circumstances. Judged against this standard I contend that on both social welfare and distributive 
justice grounds there are strong reasons to prioritise competitive market structures. I begin in 
section 1 by setting out the robust political economy perspective. Section 2 outlines and responds to 
some primary objections to markets on efficiency grounds. Section 3 addresses distributive justice 
concerns.   
 
From Ideal Theory to Robust Political Economy 
How should we evaluate the performance of social institutions? One stream of thought suggests that 
institutions should be judged against their capacity to meet ideal requirements. Without the guiding 
star of ideal theory we cannot identify measures that might improve on an imperfect status quo. 
‘Real world’ institutions may never match these criteria in full but it is suggested that specifying ideal 
criteria facilitates institutional evaluation by determining how closely different arrangements 
approximate the ideals in question. 
Ideal Theory in Economics and Political Theory 
Examples of ideal theorising are prominent in economics and political theory. In economics neo-
classical welfare analysis judges institutions against the requirements for a Pareto optimal 
equilibrium. The conditions for a private enterprise economy to fulfil this ideal are formally 
articulated in the first fundamental welfare theorem.1 These include, perfect information; perfect 
competition – where there are large numbers of buyers and sellers none of whom can exert a 
significant effect on prices; zero transactions costs; costless mobility of resources; and the absence 
of externalities. Many normative debates in economics focus on whether private markets 
approximate these requirements or whether they depart so radically from the ‘ideal’ that there is 
significant scope for a non-market mechanism to increase efficiency.2 
In political theory meanwhile ideal analysis is frequently invoked to determine the principles and the 
regime types that would characterise a fully ‘just’ set of institutions. The use of contractarian 
thought experiments by thinkers such as Rawls is designed to derive the principles and regime types 
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that would emerge under conditions of ‘full motivational compliance’.3 These idealisations are then 
used as benchmarks against which existing ‘unjust’ institutions can be judged and potentially 
reformed.4 
From the perspective of this paper, ideal theories are most useful when highlighting the institutional 
questions raised by ‘real world’ situations that deviate from the specified ‘ideals’.  In economics, the 
model of a perfect market with zero transaction costs is helpful because it enables theorists to 
understand why hierarchical business firms and dispute resolution mechanisms such as courts may 
exist. With zero transactions costs all economic activities might be arranged through spot contracts 
and any conflicts over resource use could be overcome through private bargaining. It is however, 
precisely because ‘real world’ transactions costs are positive that firms and courts may be necessary 
as institutional responses to cope with these frictions.5 Similarly in political theory, the ideal of full 
motivational compliance can be useful when highlighting the potential necessity in ‘real world’ 
contexts that depart from full compliance for the existence of states and their coercive enforcement 
powers, and in providing a rationale for controlling the behaviour of those who enforce coercive 
rules.6 
Recognising this analytical function however does not imply that ideal theories offer an appropriate 
standard of how the world can and should be made to function.  Neither do such idealisations form a 
basis for judging between different institutions. On the contrary, in ideal conditions there would be 
little reason to favour one institution over another. Under the rationality and informational 
assumptions of neo-classical general equilibrium theory for example, there would be no difference 
between the efficiency of ‘free markets’ and ‘socialist central planning’ with both regime types 
capable of maximising social welfare under these conditions.  Likewise, with full motivational 
compliance, justice would be achievable under any regime type, ranging from anarchism through to 
democracy and even authoritarianism.  
 
Robust Political Economy and Institutional Evaluation 
Instead of using ideal theory, institutional evaluation should be viewed through a ‘robust political 
economy’ (RPE) perspective. 7  In economics the analytical task is to account for the relative degrees 
of coordination witnessed under different regimes in the absence of the rationality and 
informational requirements of the first fundamental welfare theorem. Similarly, in political theory 
the RPE approach seeks to explain which levels of coercive state authority can sustain social 
cooperation when agents are not fully rational, where they disagree about justice, and where they 
may not comply with various rules. Institutions should not therefore, be indicted for failing to reach 
perfect efficiency or full compliance to justice. Rather, what needs to be explained is why we have 
the level of coordination or cooperation that we do, given the decision-making traits of ‘real world’ 
actors – and what can be learned from this experience.  
From an RPE standpoint departures from ideal theoretic conditions reflect certain ‘non-reform-able’ 
attributes of human agents that create the frictions institutions must address. A first set of frictions 
arises because people are not fully rational but act under conditions of uncertainty where 
information is often contradictory and where there is a high propensity to error. This problem is not 
reducible to one of imperfect information which can be remedied by searching out additional data. 
Errors do not simply flow from a rational calculation where it is deemed excessively costly to 
become fully informed. Rather, they often reflect ‘radical ignorance’ where agents are incapable of 
‘knowing what they do not know’. Institutions must then be judged in terms of whether they enable 
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people to adapt to and learn from unanticipated mistakes as well as unforeseen opportunities, and 
against their ability to reduce systemic or society-wide error.  
A second set of frictions arise from opportunistic behaviour. In their weakest form these reflect 
collective action dynamics where the lack of incentive for an individual to incur personal costs when 
their contribution to a decision can make no demonstrable impact on outcomes may produce 
undesirable results at the macro-scale. In their strongest form they arise from the desire of some 
agents to abuse positions of power. Institutions should thus be judged on their capacity to address 
free-rider problems, the generation of third party costs and to constrain power seeking agents.  
Whether one is evaluating institutions in terms of efficiency or distributive justice RPE emphasises 
the importance of analytical symmetry. It will not suffice to show how ignorance, uncertainty, 
collective action problems, unequal power relations and insufficient generosity lead to ‘failure’ 
under one regime type while assuming away or downplaying the same problems under an 
alternative. To establish a robust case the analyst must explain how and why their favoured model 
will be less subject to the problems concerned given its structural features and how these are likely 
to interact with non-ideal agents.  
It is important to note here that the evaluative standard favoured by RPE can only ever be one that 
compares different arrangements against each other in their propensity to cope with real world 
conditions. Institutions should not be judged against a theoretical ideal divorced from or exogenous 
to those conditions. This does not imply discarding ‘idealism’, understood as an account of 
arrangements that might improve on the status quo. Such analysis will however be an endogenous 
or imminent form of idealism. Notions of what may constitute better arrangements must arise 
through theoretical speculation and empirical observation of how different institutions address 
social frictions. The proposals offered by RPE therefore might be considered as ‘non-ideal’ 
conceptions of the ‘ideal’.  
 
Robust Political Economy and the Priority of Markets 
The remainder of this paper uses the RPE framework to defend the institutional priority of markets. 
To clarify what is meant by institutional priority I draw on Knight and Johnson’s distinction between 
first and second order institutional tasks.8 The first order task of an institution refers to how it 
allocates resources. Thus, the first order task of markets is resource allocation through decentralised 
private contracting and competitive supply and demand. The first order role of democracy 
meanwhile is to allocate resources via deliberation and majoritarian collective action. Bureaucratic 
hierarchies and courts constitute other allocation mechanisms each with their own distinctive 
operating features.  Second order tasks of institutions by contrast, refer to their ‘meta-level’ role in 
enabling societies to monitor, evaluate, reform and to choose between different mechanisms and 
thus to alter the ‘institutional mix’ within the social order. They allow  
‘an ongoing process of selecting and maintaining effective institutional arrangements by identifying failures, 
dysfunctions, externalities and coordination problems as well as remedies to them’. 9 
As Knight and Johnson emphasise, an institution deemed effective in this second order role may not 
be considered effective as a first order mechanism and vice versa. To prioritise democracy over 
markets and bureaucratic hierarchies as a second order mechanism for example would not imply 
that all decisions should be made democratically, but that democracy should determine the mix 
between markets, bureaucracies and democratic deliberation as allocation mechanisms. Unless one 
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asserts that an institution has first order priority in all tasks, then the second order role of 
monitoring performance and choosing between institutions is crucial to the robustness of the social 
order.  
The view defended here gives ‘second order’ priority to markets by advocating a basic structure that 
protects persons and their property against direct forms of coercion such as theft and fraud and 
which secures the freedom of persons to exit from arrangements they deem relatively 
unsatisfactory. The primary form of coordination within such an order is one of consensual exchange 
and freedom of contract. To prioritise freedom of contract does not, however, imply that all first 
order allocative tasks should be based on individual bargaining. In some contexts it may be desirable 
to rely on gift type relations of the sort found in families or charities. Similarly, there may be 
advantages from using organisations such as firms, cooperatives, clubs and mutual associations 
whose internal practices may be based on hierarchical control, democratic procedures or informal 
convention. Prioritising markets in this context is to favour a regime where the ‘second order’ task of 
improving allocative performance and choosing the institutional mix is carried out primarily through 
a decentralised process of contracting where there is a ‘market in institutions’. Business firms for 
example are contractual entities that suppress internal competition but are subject to external 
market forces as owner-managed firms, joint stock companies, worker cooperatives and mutual 
associations, all compete for people, sales and investment capital. Similarly, in private residential 
communities, individuals contract into a higher level organisation that regulates the freedoms of 
those entering the governance structure by dividing property rights to address potential 
externalities. These organisations are subject to competition from rival agencies with alternative 
governance models and/or supplying different packages of public goods and may themselves 
contract into higher level structures that seek to address collective action problems on a larger 
territorial scale.   
A ‘free market’ regime therefore, is not a ‘regulation free’ zone but is one where many of the rules 
governing conduct are arrived at via competition and private contracting. To prioritise markets does 
not imply that decentralised decision-making is always superior to centralisation, but to argue that 
the extent to which centralisation is preferable should itself be determined via a process of 
contractual exchange where people retain the right to exit from arrangements they deem less 
satisfactory and where there is open entry for suppliers of new institutions.  Neither is a ‘free 
market’ confined to the provision of ‘private’ goods,  but is better conceived as a tapestry of 
contractually formed institutions that supply a complex mix of goods with differing degrees of 
‘private-ness’ and  ‘publicness’.  The role of non-market/non-contractual institutions at the second 
order level is confined to the maintenance of a constitutional structure that secures property rights 
and enforces contracts, resolves disputes when there is doubt over ownership claims or 
jurisdictional authority, and to a limited number of tasks where competition may not be possible as 
an organising principle. 
 
Challenges to the Priority of Markets on Social Welfare Grounds 
Social Welfare and the Case for Central Regulation  
Though the collapse of post-war experiments with socialism has led to an appreciation of market 
processes, it is widely held that the social welfare case for ‘unfettered’ markets is not in fact robust. 
Two of the most sophisticated efficiency-related critiques have been advanced by Stiglitz10 and by 
Knight and Johnson.11 These authors suggest that real-world markets rarely meet the optimality 
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conditions specified by neo-classical welfare theory and while having genuine strengths in 
comparison to socialist structures, are prone to numerous weaknesses creating room for widespread 
and feasible improvements via government intervention. To use Knight and Johnson’s terminology, 
democratic collective action should have ‘second order’ priority either as a device for improving the 
performance of markets or in choosing to replace systems based on private contracting with 
alternative allocation procedures.  
Stiglitz in particular, suggests that the informational properties of the price system are over-rated 
and challenges what he understands to be Hayek’s argument for decentralised pricing. Stiglitz takes 
this to imply that prices communicate ‘sufficient statistics’ that enable people to allocate resources 
efficiently without needing to have any information about wider economic conditions.12 As Stiglitz 
points out however, if markets convey this much information then no market actor would ever have 
an incentive to acquire information preferring to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others by simply 
observing prices. Real world prices tend to operate when participants are able to ‘hide’ information 
from others so they cannot reach a fully efficient equilibrium without supplementary government 
action.13  
Stiglitz further suggests that real world prices are often ‘too coarse’ to perform the indirect 
communication function Hayek understands them to have because traders cannot tell whether a 
price change is due to mistaken moves to bid up/down the price of a particular good, strategic 
manipulation by other traders, or reflects genuine shifts in market conditions. Similarly, absent 
perfect futures markets participants cannot determine whether shifts in the terms of trade 
represent short or much longer term changes in underlying resource scarcities. There is therefore 
scope for government action to ‘improve’ market prices via targeted measures to better reflect the 
data ‘free markets’ may not themselves convey.14 
While recognising that effective competition need not require costless exit and entry with many 
buyers and sellers, Stiglitz maintains nonetheless that strategic behaviour in oligopolistic contexts 
impedes efficiency and that there are a large number of markets with network or returns to scale 
effects that render competition ineffective as a disciplinary mechanism creating significant scope for 
second order, central regulation to improve outcomes.15 
Knight and Johnson concur with Stiglitz’s analysis but maintain that his neo-classical account of 
‘market failure’ does not go far enough. 16 Though market failure theory suggests that decentralised 
competition may be improved upon by government regulation Knight and Johnson suggest it 
downplays the possibility that entirely non-market institutions might be more efficient and thus 
gives undue priority to markets. Just as hierarchical firms can have efficiency advantages over 
contractual bargaining so non-market structures can have similar advantages over market-based 
supply.17 For Knight and Johnson the second order case for using private contracting to determine 
the boundaries of markets defended in this paper depends on precisely the conditions required for 
their effectiveness as a first order allocation mechanism. To work effectively as a second order 
process of institutional selection, decentralised competition and private contracting must operate 
under conditions that approximate a world of perfectly competitive agents with close to full 
information and where no actor has room to engage in strategic bargaining to distort outcomes in 
their favour.18 ‘Real world’ institutional competition however, rarely operates this way so there can 
be little confidence it will select the most efficient institutional forms.  
Knight and Johnson contend that when there is uncertainty over first order effectiveness then 
democratic procedures provide a better second order mechanism for experimenting with different 
institutional mixes and for monitoring the conditions in which they operate.19 Democratic 
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procedures and especially those based on ‘democratic centralism’, facilitate experimental learning 
and adaptation. By forcing people to assert, defend and revise their own views in order to get things 
done they encourage a higher level of reflexivity. Decentralised competition by contrast allows 
agents to exit from circumstances they disapprove of, thus reducing scope for persuasion, 
deliberation and learning from others.20 
Relatedly, Knight and Johnson suggest that democracy is uniquely placed to evaluate institutions 
from a societal perspective owing to its capacity to monitor where and when the ideal conditions 
required for other institutions to function well pertain. By contrast, market participants pay no heed 
to how their own behaviour or that of actors within the wider market may lead to deviations from 
efficiency.21  Knight and Johnson thus propose a radical centralisation of decision-making at the 
second order level, where the entire institutional structure of society – the relative extent to which 
families, charities, private contracting, firms and bureaucratic hierarchies are utilised as allocation 
mechanisms – is subject to a process of collective, democratic control.  
 
Social Welfare and Market Prices 
The above critiques represent sophisticated variants of long-standing concerns over the social 
welfare properties of markets. On the view advanced here however, they depend on an 
inappropriately ideal standard and/or show a failure to demonstrate the analytical symmetry 
required for a robust comparative evaluation.  
Consider first Stiglitz’s contention that the ‘coarseness’ of ‘real world’ prices leaves significant room 
for second order government interventions to improve efficiency.  The assumption here seems to be 
that free market prices should transmit full information if they are to be favoured. In conditions of 
chronic ignorance however, there is no way for the price system or any other institutional device to 
transmit full information so why should markets be judged against this ideal?  
Stiglitz partially recognises this point when noting that: 
This pervasiveness of failure, (as compared to competitive equilibrium) while it reduces our confidence in the efficiency of 
market solutions, also reduces our confidence in the ability of government to correct them.22 
If the requirements of perfectly competitive equilibrium cannot be achieved either by unfettered 
markets or government intervention however then why use this standard to single out ‘market 
failures’? The issue must always be one of ‘failure’ compared to some available ‘real world’ 
alternative, and not in comparison to an unattainable and unidentifiable ideal. 
The strongest argument for ‘free markets’ is not that prices provide surrogates for perfect 
information, but the modest comparative institutions claim that they communicate relatively more 
information than a centrally directed alternative. In conditions of bounded rationality Hayek’s 
suggestion is that no central agency can spot and respond  to as many ‘gaps’ in the economic 
environment as effectively as a multitude of agents with the freedom to exit from and enter into 
different commercial  transactions. Market prices are always generated under conditions where 
knowledge of exchange opportunities is dispersed in an uneven manner. It is by responding to 
private perceptions of these opportunities and the subsequent generation of profits and losses that 
a gradual – not an instantaneous – coordination of economic activity occurs as the various ‘bits’ of 
data are communicated. The Stiglitzian account of ‘free-riding’ on equilibrium prices assumes that 
traders cannot profit from their information before it becomes generally available. In equilibrium 
however there is no scope for any trade to occur. On the Hayekian understanding by contrast, 
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disequilibrium prices enable market actors to spot profit opportunities and to spread information by 
taking advantage of them. In other words, imperfect market prices fulfil the critical second order 
task of enabling social actors to identify failures and instances of dis-coordination, facilitating a 
process of incremental improvement.  
Knight and Johnson share Stiglitz’s belief that the informational efficacy of private contracting 
depends on perfect futures markets populated by clairvoyant agents, but this view is mistaken. The 
case in their favour is that current market prices (profits and losses) make it relatively easier for 
people to formulate conjectures about the future, than would be the case without such prices. 
Entrepreneurs combine current price information with specialised knowledge of non-price data in 
attempting to understand the direction of the market. Their subsequent forecasts are then tested 
against rival hypotheses through profit and loss accounting with the most successful speculators 
exercising more influence over the market in future rounds of investment. Entrepreneurs cannot 
simply ‘free ride’ on market prices because price information though useful must be interpreted in 
light of more specialised knowhow. The prices emergent from specialised entrepreneurial 
competition enable a ‘rough and ready’ coordination as consumers and others lacking specialised 
knowledge of particular markets can adapt to changing supply and demand conditions of which they 
are largely ignorant. This process is ‘coarse’ but absent omniscience it could hardly be otherwise. The 
alternative of directing the market from the centre is likely to be even ‘more coarse’ because it will 
replace the competitive speculation of diverse entrepreneurs with legally enforced price-setting 
measures. If these are based on the erroneous conjectures of regulators they will have negative 
consequences for the entire market, rather than merely a part of it. 
It must be emphasised that these claims cannot be established against an objectively independent 
measure. It makes little sense to judge the performance of markets or non-market mechanisms in 
terms of ‘how close’ they get to what would occur in a full information equilibrium because that 
implies prior knowledge of the optimal pattern against which the performance of ‘real world’ 
institutions must be measured. Rather, the argument follows from a structural explanation of how a 
system based on dispersed though unequal ownership of property may facilitate a degree of 
economic adjustment when knowledge of what efficiency requires is not objectively ‘given’ to 
decision-makers. This is combined with empirical observation of the chronic surpluses and shortages 
characteristic of regimes that restrict private property rights and the price system compared to 
those that allow freer pricing systems to function and the tendency for regimes with more liberal 
pricing systems to generate higher levels of economic growth.23 
A robust case for second order intervention would need to offer a similar structural mechanism to 
explain how a system regulating prices from the centre can deal with real world uncertainties more 
effectively than a free enterprise regime. Those positing significant scope for feasible government 
interventions however, fail to explain how regulators are to overcome this ‘knowledge problem’. 
Stiglitz is forced to admit as much when noting that,  
a full corrective policy would entail taxes and subsidies on all commodities, based on estimated demand and supply 
elasticities for all commodities (and all cross elasticities). The practical information required to implement the corrective 
taxation is well beyond that available at the present time.24  
A ‘full corrective policy’ at any time it should be noted would require omniscience when it is the 
problems arising from ignorance that are at stake. Even the possibility of a ‘partially corrective’ 
policy assumes regulators can judge whether their decisions are moving towards full efficiency. Real 
world regulators however must operate in a context of imperfect knowledge where their decisions 
are not subject to simultaneous competition from agents with rival interpretations and where they 
have no equivalent of profit and loss accounting to weed out bad decisions. Consequently, these 
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agents may affect the operation of markets but have little endogenous measure of whether their 
decisions improve resource allocation in comparison to alternatives. There is then little reason to 
believe that there are widespread and feasible second order policy interventions that can ‘improve’ 
on a ‘free market’ price system. 
 
Social Welfare and Spontaneous Order 
Similar problems afflict Knight and Johnson’s contention that markets ‘fail’ the second order task of 
holistic monitoring of societal decisions. Their argument assumes that ‘ideally’ people should know 
how their decisions mesh with macro-level outcomes, but the strongest case for prioritising markets 
is that social coordination involves agents who cannot be fully aware how their actions affect macro 
patterns. Where social wholes are more complex than the sum of their individual parts people are 
necessarily ignorant of the ‘whole picture’. The comparative advantage of market competition as a 
second order institution is that it facilitates mutual adjustment in-spite of the cognitive limitations of 
all concerned. So long as production models that meet consumer demands make profits that signal 
the need for imitation and losses signal errors then the  process of ‘rough and ready’ coordination 
requires minimal holistic awareness. Similarly, so long as people can exit organisational rules that fail 
their requirements and enter others they judge more effective a spontaneous process may adapt 
the pattern of rules and reconfigure the institutional mix, without any single authority having to be 
cognisant of all the margins for improvement. Adaptation to error is likely to be speedier than in a 
centralised equivalent because actors may exit from what they perceive to be misguided structures 
without first having to secure approval from an overarching authority or majority. 
Market processes are undoubtedly ‘imperfect’, but Knight and Johnson fail to explain how 
‘democratic centralism’ would generate a more holistic picture than decentralised competition. 
Politicians and regulators may be unable to anticipate the systemic consequences of the policy 
measures they favour but will nonetheless be empowered to enforce them on unwilling parties. 
Consider here, the case of financial governance. In a comprehensive account of the dynamics 
preceding the recent crisis, Friedman and Krauss suggest that it was precisely the inability of policy-
makers to understand the effects from a maze of interacting regulatory responses to democratic 
pressures that precipitated the near collapse of the global financial system.25 These included the 
decision of monopoly central banks to set interest rates below what may have been justified by 
private savings ratios; the regulatory and fiscal inducement of government-backed mortgage 
companies to relax lending requirements for home purchase to low-income families; internationally 
enforced capital regulations which induced banks to securitise risky mortgages; and the creation of 
legally protected monopolies in the credit rating business such that the financial success of these 
agencies was not dependent on the quality of their risk assessments but on immunity from 
competition. Competitive processes may themselves generate systemic failures owing to the tunnel 
vision of their participants as also occurred prior to the financial meltdown. Absent any theoretical 
or empirical account of how ‘democratic centralism’ would reduce rather than magnify such failings 
however, then a case for prioritising these mechanisms has not been established. Empirical evidence 
here is far from clear cut, but longer term analysis on the incidence of systemic financial crises (as 
distinct from recessions or downturns) suggests that the propensity to such events has coincided 
with periods of regulatory centralisation and not with those of relative laissez faire.26  
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Social Welfare and Competition 
What of the contention that second order government regulation can improve on ‘imperfect’ 
competition? Knight and Johnson maintain that ‘markets work at their best’ when characterised by 
‘price-taking’ behaviour with no scope for strategic action. 27 In non-ideal conditions with unevenly 
distributed knowledge however, strategic behaviour may not be an anti-competitive ‘imperfection’ 
in need of ‘correction’ but may represent the essence of competition. When there is uncertainty 
about the best production methods and organisational forms then price-cutting, price 
discrimination, marketing campaigns and other strategic activities that create advantages for some 
organisations over others are the competitive means by which innovations are gradually discovered 
and diffused.28  
By contrast,  
‘under ‘perfect conditions’, ‘advertising, undercutting, improving (differentiating) the goods or services produced are all 
excluded by definition – ‘perfect competition’ means indeed the absence of all competitive activities.’29 
Stiglitz maintains that in sectors with network effects or returns to scale competition is ineffective, 
yet in fields such as telecommunications and information technology which have these 
characteristics, competition is often vigorous. That incumbent firms engage in large research and 
development expenditures is testament to their constant need to fend off attacks from innovative 
challengers. 30 
In non-ideal conditions the alternative to these ‘price-making’ environments is not perfect 
competition but ‘price setting’ or regulation of industry structure by a monopolistic authority that 
may reduce competition as centralised control of prices and profits may dampen the signals and 
incentives for would-be challengers to enter markets. The experience of ‘anti-trust’ law for example 
suggests that rather than enhancing competition regulation often acts as an impediment to it. In 
many cases firms whose practices have lowered prices and increased output have been subjected to 
suits launched by rivals and there is little evidence to suggest that anti-trust works systematically to 
increase entry.31 Where knowledge of efficiency requirements is not ‘given’ to a regulator then it has 
no obvious mechanism to determine which prices and profits represent undue ‘market power’ 
arising from network effects and other ‘imperfections’, from those that reflect better 
entrepreneurial foresight in conditions of imperfect knowledge. 
This ‘non-ideal’ case against second order central intervention also undercuts Knight and Johnson’s 
suggestion that democracy should have priority in determining when other allocative mechanisms 
meet ‘ideal’ efficiency conditions. Their argument presupposes that democratic actors can know 
which institutional mixes will bring about efficiency when it is the absence of such information that 
is the problem. A process allowing simultaneous experimentation between rules and organisational 
practices may be more likely to generate information about the appropriate mix of governance 
structures because it allows more models to be tested. Thus, deciding whether families should 
engage in food preparation and child-care themselves or should  ‘contract out’ these functions to 
commercial agencies,  not-for profit suppliers or the communal arrangements of a kibbutz will be 
aided where people can observe alternative models and not where a majority of families are able to 
enforce their preferences on dissenting minorities. Similarly, knowledge of whether environmental 
goods are better supplied via individual contracting, communal control or a hierarchical 
management structure is more likely to arise in a polycentric order where people can observe 
differences between alternative governance arrangements. 
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The case for private contracting in such matters of institutional selection does not depend on full 
information and perfect competition between institutional models. What it requires is ‘freedom of 
entry’ where alternative governance arrangements can be offered without requiring approval from 
an overarching hierarchy or majority. As the unit of competition increases in territorial scale (as may 
be the case with some larger scale public goods problems) the range of governance structures that 
may compete simultaneously in supplying these goods will be reduced and there may be lesser 
scope for new entrants to challenge established models. This hardly counts though as a decisive 
objection to the argument here because absent legal barriers to entry, institutional competition will 
be maximal. Relative to such a process, democratic centralism will reduce competition by limiting 
experimentation to a consecutive process where a fixed set of arrangements is put into practice over 
a period of time.  
Knight and Johnson’s claim that giving second order priority to markets requires perfect 
transparency and no external costs is also fallacious. Relative to democratic centralism people in 
markets may have stronger incentives to reduce information asymmetries and externalities because 
the costs of failing to become adequately informed about purchasing or locational decisions are 
concentrated on them. Under ‘democratic centralism’ these incentives may be much weaker 
because outcomes are determined by how everyone else votes in a context where the chance of any 
individual vote affecting the result is vanishingly small.32  Similarly, in a competitive environment 
with exit options people have at least some scope to ‘contract around’ the external effects of other 
people’s behaviour by entering those arrangements that reduce unwanted interferences. By 
contrast, if people cannot, save for leaving their country, exit relationships with politicians and 
regulators they will be subjected to massive collective action problems and exposure to externalities 
generated by the political activities of others.33 In comparative terms therefore, democratic 
processes may be less transparent and more prone to externalities than the markets over which 
Knight and Johnson want them to have priority. 
The forgoing analysis is well supported by a variety of evidence.  Empirical work on markets and 
institutional competition indicates that even agents with minimal information and bargaining power 
are more informed about their choices than participants in most large number elections.34 
Historically, a wide range of authors have suggested that it was the political anarchy between 
competing states and jurisdictional authorities such as churches, monarchs and merchants that 
reigned across medieval Western Europe that acted as a laboratory for institutional experimentation 
and constrained possibilities for elite predation. Notwithstanding massive background inequalities 
with the vast majority excluded from political power, competitive dynamics pushed elites towards 
less predatory governance and facilitated the unprecedented economic expansion of the industrial 
revolution.35 The highly centralised structures in Russia and China, however, appear to have stifled 
innovation and economic progress. More recently, Ostrom’s work on common pool resources 
indicates that effective solutions to small and middle-range public goods problems are more likely to 
be discovered and disseminated in a context of ‘parallel adaptation’, where no authority has the 
capacity to impose a particular set of governance rules. When the range of institutional devices such 
as individual property, communal or club property and various mixed regimes is generated via a 
bottom up process where the smallest units have the freedom to ‘contract up’ their authority this 
increases the chance of creating governance structures that internalise costs. Top down imposition 
of institutional rules is correlated with a greater propensity to systemic failure36   
Only in a small number of instances where simultaneous competition is impossible might there be a 
strong case for a collective choice mechanism to have second order priority. Obvious candidates 
here include large scale transboundary issues such as anthropogenic climate change where the 
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nature of the good may preclude the possibility of internalising costs at any institutional level lower 
than the global scale. There is for example a strong non-ideal case for a centralised mechanism to 
impose a global tax on carbon emissions which would force polluters to pay for environmental 
damages while retaining the scope for lower level institutions - whether, nations, communities, firms 
or families - to choose the means through which to meet the tax in question.  
Though the case for centralisation is undoubtedly strongest in these instances it is by no means clear 
cut. The tragedy of climate change is that while the failure to institute a global mechanism may 
generate significant economic and social costs the creation of a global enforcement institution 
would not be without significant risks of its own – such as for example mistakenly imposing a tax at 
levels that will generate higher economic and social costs than the effects of climate change itself. 
Beyond a certain point of centralisation the ability of decision-makers to minimise the consequences 
of mistakes, to learn from other decision-making nodes and to adapt speedily to changing conditions 
may be so blunted that the scope for systemic failure may negate any benefits that central 
regulation might in principle bring – even in the absence of a credible decentralised alternative.37  
The analysis presented in this section has offered a non-ideal social welfare case for giving markets 
and freedom of contract second order priority. Though few contemporary societies suppress 
markets in the manner of post-war socialism, many do engage to a greater or lesser extent in 
democratic measures that limit competition and freedom of contract. In fields such as  financial 
services, education, health-care, energy supply and environmental regulation the scope for people 
to craft contracts and the price structures emergent from them is often constrained by top-down 
attempts to ‘improve’ on the market outcome. Similarly, while few societies are so centralised as to 
eliminate institutional competition even some of the more decentralised political systems limit the 
extent to which citizens can develop contractual rules and governance structures to shape markets 
and to address collective action problems from the ‘bottom up’. Relative to this status quo there are 
potential gains from moving towards regimes that allow greater contractual freedoms and that 
enhance competition. Far from improving on the status quo the proposals by Stiglitz and by Knight 
and Johnson for still greater central intervention seem in the vast majority of cases, more likely to 
reduce social welfare.  
 
Challenges to the Priority of Markets on Distributive Justice Grounds 
The previous section focussed on efficiency arguments and did not consider the social justice case 
for prioritising markets. While classical liberals maintain that these structures enhance social welfare 
they also emphasise the value of consent in human relationships. A context where people have 
secure property rights and exit options is thought to widen scope for individuals to develop their 
capacity for judgement and to minimise external coercion.  
 
Distributive Justice and the Case for Central Regulation  
Ethical critics of classical liberalism do not disregard these arguments but contend that assigning 
them undue priority neglects the moral status of the bargaining terms on which people make their 
choices. I concentrate here on Rawlsian arguments and those made by Knight and Johnson.  
For Rawls, a just society is one whose institutional rules reflect impartial principles that people 
would willingly support rather than those they may be forced to accept owing to a lack of bargaining 
power. Rawls deploys the theoretical device of the original position to neutralise the effects of 
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inequalities that might advantage the beneficiaries of genetic and social lotteries when choosing 
principles of justice. Agents behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ know nothing of their own attributes and 
imagine themselves to be choosing rules for a ‘closed society’ to prevent those with potentially 
greater bargaining power from extracting more favourable terms of association. Rawls’s initial 
account suggested that impartial deliberators would converge on the components of ‘justice as 
fairness’; the principle of equal liberty, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle – 
which requires that any inequalities work to the maximum benefit of representative agents from the 
least advantaged class . In his later work, Rawls abandoned the notion that deliberators would opt 
for justice as fairness from a common evaluative standpoint suggesting instead the possibility of an 
‘overlapping consensus’ between agents with a range of differing though ‘reasonable’ worldviews.38  
Central to the Rawlsian account is the necessity for coercive measures to ‘guarantee’ fairness in a 
societies’ basic structure. This includes provision of a social minimum and the supply of publicly 
provided or subsidised education to ensure fair equality of opportunity. In addition, it requires a 
distributive branch of government that preserves approximate justice by means of taxation and 
necessary adjustments to the rights of property.39 In Knight and Johnson’s terminology Rawls 
envisages a central ‘second order’ role for the state in monitoring and correcting the background 
distributive conditions in which other institutions operate. It is the absence of such mechanisms 
under classical liberalism that for Rawls disqualifies it from the family of ‘reasonable’ world views. 
Under a regime prioritising markets and freedom of contract the more advantaged might exit their 
obligations to provide sufficient support to the disadvantaged or they might provide support in a 
manner that demeans the social status of the poor as free and equal citizens. By contrast, if one 
assumes full motivational compliance the regime types of liberal socialism and property owning 
democracy represent potentially just structures because they have an extensive coercive apparatus 
designed to guarantee fairness.  40   
In their account of the second order role of the state, Knight and Johnson emphasise the significance 
of disagreement about the requirements of justice and/or the extent to which justice should be 
prioritised over other objectives such as economic growth and environmental protection. For Knight 
and Johnson the strength of democracy rests on its ability to organise experiments with alternative 
social models and to reduce conflict. By ensuring divergent voices are heard democratic mechanisms 
facilitate learning and can sustain support from those losing out from any specific decision. 
Prioritising private contracting on the other hand would produce outcomes reflecting differential 
bargaining power and would thus lack legitimacy in the eyes of weaker parties.                              
Knight and Johnson emphasise that to fulfil its potential democracy must be supplemented with 
‘institutional guarantees’ to ensure all citizens can exercise maximum equal influence. State 
organisations must intervene directly in private and civil associations to reduce material inequalities 
and power imbalances and to secure ‘free and equal participation’. These proposals are similar to 
those of a Rawlsian ‘property owning democracy’ which seeks to limit the scope for those with 
greater bargaining strength - such as private employers, to interfere with the political choices of 
weaker parties. If people are guaranteed sufficient income and job security such that they need not 
fear the prospect of unemployment or loss of income then democratic processes may approximate a 
free and un-coerced process of deliberation. 41 Income redistribution alone may however be 
insufficient if the prevailing pattern of norms– such as those pertaining to gender, constrains the 
capacity of some people to use material resources effectively – by for example limiting access to 
high status jobs or discouraging  political participation. For Knight and Johnson therefore, 
guaranteeing effective participation requires intervention in the workplace, in the family, in the 
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education of young children and even in religious beliefs and practices to prohibit social norms that 
reduce prospects for democratic equality. 42 
 
Justice, Markets and Constitutional Ignorance 
With its claim that classical liberalism subjects weaker parties to unjustifiable bargaining terms the 
Rawlsian approach departs most significantly from the requirements of the RPE framework. The 
assumption appears to be that knowledge of what full compliance with justice entails is objectively 
attainable and can be used as a benchmark from which to construct a more just set of arrangements. 
The problem of ‘real world’ justice however arises precisely because social interaction takes place in 
a context of fragmented and contradictory knowledge where there is no objective way to discern 
‘fair terms of cooperation’. In these circumstances it is no more plausible to evaluate institutions 
against full compliance with justice as fairness than it is to judge them against full compliance with 
efficiency. It is not clear therefore why classical liberal institutions or indeed any other institutions 
should be evaluated against this ideal.  
The strongest ethical case for institutions that give second order priority to markets is that relative 
to alternative systems they may be better placed to accommodate rival interpretations of fairness. A 
system limiting direct coercion to the enforcement of a clear private domain where people can enter 
into or refrain from various exchanges is hypothesised to reduce conflict relative to alternatives 
where no rules are enforced, or where the rules of ownership are so uncertain that people can have 
no confidence that their decisions will be respected. The purpose of these institutions is not to 
secure distributive justice per se but to provide space for the discovery and communication of 
alternative terms of cooperation in conditions where no central agency or group can be aware how 
to deliver fair terms of exchange. The ‘real world’ alternative to a framework emphasising 
competition and private contracting is not one that ‘guarantees’  fair cooperation but one that 
empowers a monopolistic authority to enforce what it considers the right pattern of distribution, 
however erroneous such a view may be.   
Assuming that for example, there is an overlapping consensus supporting the difference principle or 
fair equality of opportunity, the question of how to discover the patterns of resource allocation 
commensurate with these principles, remains. Does justice require cash transfers to the 
disadvantaged or might it be achieved by maintaining the conditions where the poor are more likely 
to secure employment? Which educational models are better placed to reveal the talents people 
have and to increase the opportunities available to them? If it is to discover how to achieve 
distributive fairness then the basic structure of society must allow experimentation with and 
learning from, different welfare models. Though it cannot guarantee that the relevant principles will 
be secured, a system based on market exchange, one to one giving, and voluntary associations may 
increase the chance of securing ‘more just’ outcomes over time. When there is limited and 
contradictory knowledge the suggestion by Rawls that the absence of compulsory redistribution 
constitutes injustice, is inappropriate. It assumes the possibility of a political-legal apparatus 
populated by omniscient regulators who can manipulate the basic structure to produce ‘justice’. In 
‘real world’ conditions however the knowledge of which practices fulfil with these principles cannot 
be centralised in a single institution and indeed such knowledge may not even exist outside of a 
competitive environment where contradictory interpretations can be tested against each other and 
adapted in response to shifting circumstances of time and place.  
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Unlike Rawls, Knight and Johnson do not rely on an assumption of political-legal omniscience but see 
democracy as an experimental second order procedure to discover appropriate terms of association 
under conditions of heterogeneous and dispersed knowledge. In comparison to a constitutional 
structure that prioritises markets and private contract, however, the nature of this experimentalism 
will be unduly constrained. Knight and Johnson believe that ‘democratic centralism’ can mobilise 
dispersed knowledge by ensuring the widest possible range of viewpoints is reflected in the resource 
allocation compromises that result. Yet this claim is undermined, because such a process is 
heterogeneous only before the relevant decisions are made.  The generation of knowledge and 
scope for learning will be stunted because once a government has been elected people will be 
unable to test and to learn about the effects of alternatives on a simultaneous basis.  
Now, it might be argued that scope for learning is not so limited because politicians and regulators 
can compare the results emergent from the policies of different nation states. Note, however that 
this response acknowledges the priority of simultaneous competition over the democratic centralism 
favoured by Knight and Johnson. It is the absence of the simultaneous supply of alternative models 
that stifles the capacity to learn from a wider range of experiences. Similarly, unless people can 
move into those jurisdictions they find more palatable and away from those they find less so 
signalling mechanisms will be blunted. Within this context, there is little reason to privilege the 
nation state as the primary unit of experimentation. The structures of competitive federalism may 
allow for a more decentralised system that would facilitate the testing of a greater range of welfare 
models and create more room for exit. If experimentation is enhanced under federalist structures 
there is also a strong case for a more radical decentralisation of distributive decisions down to 
individuals and voluntary associations, acting through the mosaic of institutions that constitute the 
market and civil society – though individuals acting through these institutions should also have the 
liberty to ‘contract up’ welfare provision should they judge higher level structures more efficacious. 
 
Compliance, Monitoring and Power Relations 
Discussion of these epistemic issues must be coupled with consideration of how to control those 
charged with enforcing coercive rules and the extent to which these rules are open to abuse by 
opportunistic agents.  
Rawls theorises away the problem of enforcement with the assumption that the coercive 
mechanisms available to state agencies will ‘guarantee’ justice under ‘full motivational compliance’. 
Rawls views state action as solving an assurance problem equivalent to deciding ‘rules of the road’, 
where agents will follow the rules so long as they know that others will do the same. In such cases 
public authority may be needed to specify the rules but once they have been chosen it will be in the 
interests of all parties to comply. Where the rules in question involve the empowerment of some 
actors to redistribute resources and to regulate commercial and civil life however, then it seems 
more appropriate to view adherence to Rawlsian rules as generating multiple ‘compliance 
problems’.  Compliance problems arise when it may not be in the personal interests of an individual 
or a group to adhere to the rules and where there may be a need for effective monitoring 
procedures not only for those subject to the rules but also for those charged with enforcing them. 
Rawls, however, pays little attention to whether his favoured regime types would in ‘real world’ 
conditions lead to abuses and how these might undermine a cooperative social order. 
The difficulties surrounding abuses of state power highlighted above follow from the huge 
informational burdens and compliance costs that regimes reserving a significant regulatory and 
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distributive role for public bodies, place on their citizens. The lack of clarity over which policies fulfil 
the difference principle for example makes it difficult, if not impossible to hold accountable 
politicians, regulators and citizens who fail to act in accordance with the principle. It is hard to tell on 
balance whether the institutions of the modern regulatory and redistributive state work to improve 
the material position and bargaining power of the least advantaged or whether they weaken that 
position. Contemporary welfare state models of capitalism involve a significant amount of 
‘downward’ redistribution through direct income transfers but they may also reduce economic 
growth and lower the absolute incomes and bargaining power that the disadvantaged may 
command in the longer term.43 In addition, they frequently involve large scale ‘upward’ 
redistributions such as the massive transfers to the banking sector that followed the financial crisis. 
Similarly, regulation in fields such as land use planning, occupational licensure, and energy markets 
is often the product of rent seeking behaviour and works to raise living costs for the disadvantaged 
while enhancing the position of incumbent property owners and incumbent firms. 44  
Even when the balance of interventions works to improve the position of the least advantaged 
within the boundaries of the state it may worsen the bargaining terms of those thereby prevented 
from entering such a state. Evidence suggests that the extent of mandatory wealth transfers 
correlates with more stringent controls on entry. To avoid excessive dis-incentive effects on the 
successful and to maintain transfers to current recipients some of the most disadvantaged agents in 
the world may have their option set curtailed via more restrictive immigration controls45. If, as 
Rawls’s egalitarian critics suggest, impartial justice requires paying due attention to the 
disadvantaged beyond the boundaries of any one state46 then by raising barriers to entry mandatory 
redistribution may be in direct conflict with this objective. Indeed, on a classical liberal view 
immigration controls represent one of the most egregious abuses of state power because they 
actively block attempts by the least advantaged to improve their position and prevent mutually 
beneficial interactions between consenting parties.  
Knight and Johnson show some awareness of the problems that enlarging state power may induce, 
but maintain that democracy provides the best antidote to these ills. Thus, 
Given the obvious concerns about the effects of state power, we should be understandably concerned about the legitimacy 
of state intervention. On our account, the task of determining the kinds of activities that would constitute violations of the 
free and equal protection requirement rests with the population itself…..     And this has the following institutional 
implication: the task of guaranteeing the legitimacy of state interference is but one aspect of the general task of self-
monitoring attributed to democracy.47 
This response is however entirely unsatisfactory, because it is the inability of democracy to perform 
the second order role of ‘self-monitoring’ under the massive interventionist state Knight and 
Johnson favour, that is the issue. On the one hand national majoritarianism will do little for the 
interests of those who reside outside the boundaries of the states concerned. On the other hand, 
‘democratic centralism’ within nation states will generate enormous monitoring costs for voters in 
deciphering whether redistributive and regulatory interventions are being used to public advantage 
or for the benefit of sectional interests. Voters will have minimal incentives to be well informed 
about the effects of interventions because the chance that their personal decision to become 
informed will affect outcomes is infinitesimally small. It will not suffice to blame existing power 
imbalances on wealth inequality in contemporary welfare-regulatory states for inequality of political 
influence. Asymmetric information associated with voter ignorance would introduce significant bias 
into ‘democratic centralist’ structures even when wealth is more evenly distributed. Evidence on 
political participation across contemporary social democracies shows no significant differences in 
levels of political participation between higher and lower income and wealth inequality societies.48 
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What is consistent both within and across such societies, however, is the high level of political 
ignorance. Irrespective of income, educational level and social class, the vast majority of people are 
ignorant of even the most basic political information and so they are rarely able to determine the 
extent to which political power is being abused.49   
These problems are significant enough in the context of contemporary democratic welfare states. 
Regulatory and welfare state institutions have not arisen via a bottom up process of private 
contracting but through one that has given priority to the decisions of national majority coalitions 
that reduce the range of exit options. Such problems are however likely to be even more 
pronounced under the structures proposed by Rawls and by Knight and Johnson. Under Rawlsian 
‘liberal socialism’ the absence of significant private ownership and the concentration of power in 
state agencies would further reduce exit options and produce not only greater inefficiency but huge 
scope for corruption, rent seeking and abuse of the liberties of those dependent on the relevant 
state bodies. The post-independence political economy of India between 1947 and 1991 is probably 
the closest approximation one can find to ‘liberal socialism’ – and this was a regime characterised by 
predatory state licensing boards (the ‘permit raj’), predatory state monopolies, upward 
redistribution from agricultural communities to urban elites, and political corruption on a massive 
scale.50  
Similarly, under ‘property owning democracy’ the powers to break up private businesses and to alter 
prices when these are deemed by officials as incompatible with justice would open significant 
opportunities for politicians and regulators to engage in redistribution and regulation that would 
favour their own interests and those of client groups. Far from reducing power imbalances these 
institutions are likely to favour the politically connected and those rent seeking interests better 
placed to overcome collective action problems. Moreover, allowing regulators to be the arbiters of 
which beliefs and traditions cohere with ‘free and equal participation’ does not seem compatible 
with treating those who subscribe to ‘non-approved’ beliefs and traditions as ‘free and equal’ and 
may open the door to institutionalised prejudice.  
By contrast, while it may not eradicate unequal power relations a social order giving greater priority 
to markets and freedom of contract may reduce the scope for powerful state and private agents to 
capture and abuse positions of coercive political authority and to engage in zero sum games. While it 
would welcome voluntary  ‘downward redistribution’, a regime giving priority to freedom of contract 
would limit the scope for ‘upward redistribution’ by containing state power to the enforcement of 
contractual agreements between private parties and civil associations.  Correspondingly, by lowering 
costs of compliance it may encourage agents to open themselves to the possibility of mutually 
advantageous cooperation with agents beyond the confines of national borders, relative to regimes 
that reserve a central place for mandatory redistribution in their basic structure. 
From a comparative standpoint the costs of discerning whether private and public actors abide by 
the terms of classical liberal justice while non-trivial, would be more limited than those required to 
monitor the interventionist apparatus envisaged by its critics. In non-ideal conditions classical liberal 
institutions may make it relatively easier for people to discern transgressions, to hold perpetrators to 
account and to sustain a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, on the widest possible scale. 
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Conclusion 
I have sought in this paper to offer a non-ideal case for prioritising markets in the basic structure of 
society. I have not, however, addressed a further aspect of ‘non-ideal’ theory that explores the 
feasibility of policies that may constitute movements in the direction of these arrangements. Rather, 
my analysis should be seen as an attempt to specify the characteristics of a regime type that would 
seem worth trying to implement given the constraints set by the human condition. Others may wish 
to challenge the robustness of the arguments offered here on similarly non-ideal grounds. I submit 
however, that such a response should exhibit greater analytical symmetry than has hitherto been 
evident from those who reject the priority of markets.  
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